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Abstract
Inspired by a recent observation about an online retail company, this paper explains 
why a firm may find it optimal to offer an exit bonus to recent hires so as to induce 
self-selection. We study a double adverse selection problem, in which the principal 
can neither observe agents’ commitment to the job nor their intrinsic motivation. A 
steep wage-tenure profile deters uncommitted agents from applying. An exit bonus 
can stimulate that—among the committed agents—those who discovered that they 
are not intrinsically motivated for the job discontinue employment with the princi-
pal. Our key findings are that offering an exit bonus increases profits when the first 
adverse selection problem is sufficiently severe compared to the second and that the 
exit bonus needs to come as a surprise for the agents in order to function well.
Keywords Intrinsic motivation · Commitment · Self-selection · Wage 
compensation · Exit bonus · Transparency
JEL Classification J31 · J33 · M52 · M55
1 Introduction
Recently, an online vendor in the United States has caught attention with an unusual 
hiring practice; Zappos of Henderson, Nevada has been running a scheme offering 
all newly hired employees after their first 4 weeks a one-off payment of $4000 if 
they decide to quit. According to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Zappos, the 
idea behind this policy is to provide newcomers with an additional incentive to leave 
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the company if they find out that they do not completely fit in with the corporate 
culture (cf. Hsieh 2010). A few other tech companies have copied the practice in the 
meanwhile, including Amazon, Lot18, and Riot Games (see Taylor 2014; Jeffries 
2012; Edwards 2014).
Reactions to this uncommon policy have been mixed. In a Harvard Business 
Review Blog entry titled “Why Zappos Pays New Employees to Quit—And You 
Should Too”, Taylor (2008) attributes the online shoe store’s fast growth to the qual-
ity of their customer service. He suggests that the exit bonus has been essential in 
selecting the right employees for this task and recommends other companies to copy 
Zappos’ practice: “[Offering the exit bonus is] a small practice with big implica-
tions: Companies don’t engage emotionally with their customers—people do. If you 
want to create a memorable company, you have to fill your company with memo-
rable people” (Taylor 2008). A Bloomberg Businessweek article is, however, more 
critical about Zappos’ hiring practice, wondering: “[What] if hordes of people are 
going to start queueing up outside Zappos [...], what’s to keep every young hopeful 
with gas money to roll in, attend part of the training, and head down the highway to 
the casinos with $2000 in his pocket? It will be interesting to see what the impact of 
word-of-mouth will have on this odd HR process” (McFarland 2008).1
This paper explores under what conditions an exit bonus could be part of a profit-
maximizing personnel policy. Our theory picks up key aspects of the two articles 
quoted above. We show that it can be optimal for a firm to offer an exit bonus, 
because it promotes self-selection of unmotivated workers out of employment, 
as suggested by Taylor (2008). On the other hand, this practice can be dangerous 
because it may attract workers without intentions to remain with the firm, as pointed 
out by McFarland (2008). In line with this, and consistent with Zappos’ conduct, we 
show that the exit bonus needs to come as a surprise for workers in order to function 
well.
In our principal-agent model, agents differ in three respects: their commitment 
to the job, their outside opportunities, and their intrinsic motivation to work for the 
principal. All of these aspects are private information of the agents, which gives rise 
to two adverse selection problems. First, the principal would like to avoid hiring 
uncommitted agents who know beforehand that they only want to work for her for 
a short while. She can resolve this first problem by setting a low wage for an initial 
period. This, however, necessitates offering a high wage for the remaining time in 
order to satisfy the committed agents’ participation constraint, similar to the classic 
model in Lazear (1979). The heterogeneity in outside options affects the severity 
of the first adverse selection problem and thereby influences the wage differential 
between periods.
At the time of application to the job, agents are already aware of the realizations 
of the first two dimensions of heterogeneity, namely their level of commitment and 
their outside opportunities. However, they only learn about their intrinsic motivation 
to work for the principal during the initial period. We thus follow Jovanovic (1979) 
in treating a job as an experience good—the only way of finding out whether the 
job is a good match, or in our case whether an agent is intrinsically motivated to 
1 Initially, the level of the exit bonus was $2000. Later, it was increased to $4000.
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work in this particular job, is experiencing it. The agent’s motivation cannot be read-
ily observed by the principal. This precipitates the second adverse selection prob-
lem, because the principal prefers to retain only motivated agents. Handy and Katz 
(1998) and Delfgaauw and Dur (2007) show that such an adverse selection problem 
could be mitigated from the outset by offering a low wage so that only motivated 
agents find it worthwhile to apply for the job. This is, however, not possible in our 
setting, because the job is an experience good. Thus the overall wage profile needs 
to be attractive enough to convince agents to apply before it is clear to them whether 
they will enjoy the job. Consequently, the firm inevitably hires some agents who 
discover that they are unmotivated and do not enjoy the job. The principal could 
prompt these agents to quit by offering a lower wage once agents have discovered 
their motivational type. Such a policy, however, conflicts with the solution to the 
adverse selection problem concerning agents’ commitment, which calls for a steep 
wage-tenure profile. As a result, unmotivated agents may, despite their lack of moti-
vation, find it in their best interest to stay at the firm if the wage profile is sufficiently 
steep. A solution to this problem is offering an exit bonus after the initial period, 
which persuades unmotivated agents to quit. We show that such an exit bonus is part 
of a profit-maximizing personnel policy if solving the first adverse selection prob-
lem necessitates a sufficiently steep wage profile and if intrinsic motivation plays a 
comparatively minor role.
As pointed out by McFarland (2008), the exit bonus may attract uncommitted 
agents. Our analysis validates this concern: we find that the exit bonus can only be 
a viable instrument if it is kept secret ex ante. This is so because it would be a per-
fect substitute for the wage-tenure profile if it were anticipated. Hence, the principal 
cannot resolve both adverse selection problems anymore if agents take into account 
that they will be offered an exit bonus later on. Consistent with this, Zappos does not 
advertise the exit bonus. While Zappos does confirm its practice in interviews and 
on its website, these sources are directed at interested outsiders rather than potential 
future employees. Most importantly, there is no mention of the exit bonus in job 
descriptions or on the recruitment website (see e.g. Zappos 2013a; the same holds 
for the companies that copied Zappos’ policy that we mention above).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides an 
overview of the related literature. Section 3 describes the model. Results are pre-
sented and discussed in Sect. 4, followed by a concluding section.
2  Related Literature
The recent attention Zappos and others have received for their practice to pay an exit 
bonus (cf. Taylor 2008, 2014; McFarland 2008; Jeffries 2012; Edwards 2014) sug-
gests it is an uncommon, perhaps surprising, policy. We do agree with this notion 
and only know of a handful of firms using such an instrument. Then again, our 
theory predicts that it should not be advertised, so not knowing about firms using 
an exit bonus may simply be due to the fact that they try to keep such practices 
in the dark. Nonetheless, another closely related phenomenon can be observed in 
compensation packages, most prominently in those of executive officers: severance 
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pay. Crucial differences between the exit bonus offered by Zappos and severance pay 
packages are that the former is offered to all recent hires to stimulate voluntary quits, 
while the latter are incidentally granted upon involuntary departure of employees. 
A commonly used term for severance pay in executive contracts is the Golden Para-
chute, whereas a Golden Handshake labels severance pay that is awarded on a dis-
cretionary basis. Theoretical literature on severance pay explains why it may arise 
in a principal-agent setting and what the welfare implications of its introduction are.
Lazear (1990) analyzes effects of a state-mandated severance pay on the labor 
market. His theoretical prediction is that compulsory severance pay should not mat-
ter in a frictionless world: in a competitive labor market, employers will require 
workers to pay a fee upfront to offset the expected severance pay. However, this 
result may be nullified by, for example, restrictions on the borrowing and lending 
opportunities of employees. Lazear’s (1990) empirical analysis of a 22-country 
panel suggests that the introduction of severance pay requirements indeed leads to a 
lower employment rate.
Rather than from legal coercion, severance pay may emerge voluntarily for sev-
eral reasons. Much of the theoretical literature incorporates the idea that a risk-
neutral principal offers a form of insurance against unstable income to risk-averse 
agents. This insurance may be provided either by a contract with guaranteed employ-
ment (Baily 1974; Gordon 1974; Azariadis 1975; Akerlof and Miyazaki 1980) or by 
a contract that warrants severance pay in case of a layoff (Grossman and Hart 1981; 
Hart and Holmstrom 1987; Pissarides 2001; see Parsons 2019 for a discussion of the 
differences between these two types of insurance). In fact, a focus in this research 
has been set on explaining why such insurance is not offered more extensively (see 
for example Kahn 1985; or Ito 1988). Similar to the insurance argument, Booth and 
Chatterji (1989) develop a model in which a worker who partially bears the cost of 
firm-specific training requires to be compensated in case of dismissal. It is impor-
tant to note that the exit bonus we study is only paid after a voluntary quit, not if 
the employee is fired. As such, it does not provide insurance against unemployment. 
Furthermore, if it were offered for insurance reasons, it would be advertised and 
made part of the contract ex ante rather than come as a surprise.2
Another reason why severance pay could be observed lies in a change of outside 
opportunities of the agent. Lazear (1981) considers a setup where principals incen-
tivize agents to exert effort with a steep wage-tenure profile. A situation may arise 
where agents are paid above their marginal product towards the end of their careers. 
2 According to Yermack (2006), severance pay to CEOs is most often granted in the form of a Golden 
Handshake. He adds to the insurance argument, possibly in the form of an implicit contract: “In cases of 
risk aversion or effort avoidance, CEOs would be more likely to pursue value maximizing strategies due 
to the security provided by severance pay” (p. 241). In the case of Golden Parachutes, severance pay can 
help to make sure that a CEO does not prevent a take-over of the firm that is in the interest of the share-
holders (cf. Lambert and Larcker 1985). On top of this, Yermack (2006) offers three more reasons for 
paying a departing executive: rent extraction—a powerful manager may be able to expropriate sharehold-
ers; ex post settling up—severance pay may be used to compensate a successful CEO at the end of his 
career for being underpaid before; and damage control—severance pay may be made in exchange for a 
confidentiality or non-litigation agreement by the manager. None of these arguments seem to bear much 
relevance in our context.
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When an agent receives an unanticipated outside offer, the principal may choose 
to offer a one-off payment for efficient separation in lieu of the above-productivity 
wage. Note that this payment is made after a voluntary quit, a situation quite similar 
to that considered in our model. There are two crucial differences though. First, the 
exit bonus in our model needs to come as a surprise, whereas in Lazear’s (1981) 
model it pays off for the principal to announce that severance pay may be offered 
after a shock to the agents’ outside options. This is so because the anticipation of a 
possible severance payment would make it easier to convince the agent to accept the 
job. Second, the severance pay in Lazear (1981) would only occur for agents who 
are in the later stages of their careers, whereas the exit bonus that we study is offered 
to new hires.
Other papers have studied a scenario where a change of market conditions makes 
an employer want to reduce the number of employees. Sometimes, simply firing 
employees is not possible or prohibitively costly, for example in the public sector, 
in markets with strong labor rights, or where (potential) customers may be strongly 
opposed to large layoffs. Levy and McLean (1996), Jeon and Laffont (1999), and 
Rama (1999) deal with the question of how to reduce the work force in such a situa-
tion and all include a form of severance pay in their analyses.3
The paper that comes closest to our approach is that of Inderst and Mueller 
(2010), who consider the effect of Golden Parachutes on information revelation by 
CEOs. As mentioned above, such agreements are usually only put into effect upon 
involuntary departure. Inderst and Mueller (2010), however, argue that the replace-
ment of a CEO must be incentive compatible for him, because he is often the only 
person that could disclose information to the board that would lead to his termina-
tion. As such, severance pay may be used as a tool to make CEOs reveal when they 
are a bad match to the firm, in which case they would be fired. The central finding of 
their theoretical paper is that steep incentive pay may be a less costly instrument to 
this end than severance pay. Our approach differs from Inderst and Mueller’s (2010) 
in four ways: First, we assume that the principal cannot make use of a performance 
measure, thus there is no way to implement an incentive pay scheme. Instead, the 
agent’s utility is linked to the principal’s profits through intrinsic motivation to exert 
effort.4 Second, our model incorporates an additional adverse selection problem at 
the moment of hiring. We argue that uncommmitted agents must be deterred from 
applying, a problem that is less of an issue when hiring a CEO, as more information 
about him is available to the principal. Third, Inderst and Mueller (2010) impose a 
limited liability constraint, which is not necessary in our setup. Fourth, we find that 
the exit bonus needs to be a secret at the time of hiring.
Finally, our work relates to an emerging literature arguing that full transpar-
ency of personnel policies can be suboptimal. Jehiel (2015) shows that it can pay 
off for a firm to leave workers in the dark concerning what performance measures 
they will be evaluated on, how their coworkers’ incentive schemes are set up, and 
what exactly the production function of the firm is. He finds that non-transparency 
3 See also Foarta and Sugaya (2019) for a related study in the context of “acqui-hiring”.
4 As we shall argue in the next section, this fits well with the case of Zappos.
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becomes advisable as soon as the dimensionality of moral hazard problems is larger 
than that of one agent’s action space. The idea behind this is that it may be cheaper 
for the principal to resolve several moral hazard problems with one single incentive 
constraint. In simple words, if a worker knows his performance will be assessed, but 
does not know how, he might exert more effort (see also Lazear 2006; Ederer et al. 
2018 for related arguments). Likewise, Von Thadden and Zhao (2012) find that it 
can be a good idea to offer incomplete contracts concerning the agent’s action space, 
arguing: “if [...] the employee is unaware of some shirking behavior, then it may 
not be optimal [...] to regulate this kind of activity in the contract, since this makes 
[him] aware of the activity and necessitates the provision of costly incentives” (p. 
1152).
3  The Model
Our model features two periods: Period 1 consists of one term, whereas Period 2 
consists of n terms. At the beginning of Period 1, the principal can hire particu-
lar agents if she offers a wage profile that satisfies their participation constraint and 
deter other types of agents from applying with a wage profile that violates their con-
straint. Agents differ along three dimensions (commitment, motivation, and outside 
option), none of which is readily observable to the principal. The principal’s payoff 
increases in an agent’s effort and decreases in his compensation. Agent i’s utility in 
term t when employed by the principal is given by:
where wt denotes the wage, and fi
(
eit
)
 captures the impact on utility of effort eit that 
the agent exerts when working for the principal. We avail ourselves of the following 
functional form:
which allows for agents to experience a certain joy of work, as long as their motiva-
tion parameter 훾i is positive. A key assumption in our paper is that agents only learn 
the value of their motivation parameter by working for the principal for one term. 
Ex ante, the agent only knows he can be the motivated type, with 𝛾 = ?̄? > 0 , or the 
unmotivated one, with 훾 = 0 ; these two cases can occur with probabilities 0 < q < 1 
and 1 − q , respectively. Motivated agents’ incentives are thus partially aligned with 
those of the principal, because they enjoy exerting effort to some extent, as in e.g. 
Benabou and Tirole (2003), Besley and Ghatak (2005), and Delfgaauw and Dur 
(2007). The principal in our model has no means of monitoring effort.5 Hence, an 
agent’s pay or retainment cannot be conditioned on his effort. The principal can 
commit to a wage-tenure profile and, if she wishes, to offering an exit bonus.
Uit = wt + fi
(
eit
)
,
fi
(
eit
)
= 훾ieit −
1
2
휃e2
it
,
5 We also assume that the principal cannot contract on a noisy effort measure, like performance. As 
a matter of fact, Zappos explicitly condemns performance measures; the reasoning behind this is that 
employees are supposed to deliver better work, e.g. a friendlier customer service, when they are not mon-
itored and can act freely (Hsieh 2010).
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When not working for the principal, agents derive per-term utility Vi , posing another 
source of heterogeneity. We allow the outside option utility of agents to be V or V , with 
V > V . The principal has the opportunity to augment the outside option of her agents 
in Period 2 by offering an exit bonus b. We rule out indentured servitude; that is, we 
assume that b ≥ 0 . Furthermore, we assume that the exit bonus comes as a surprise to 
agents if the principal decides not to advertise it. Finally, agents differ in their commit-
ment to the principal: uncommitted agents know for sure they are looking for employ-
ment with the principal for Period 1 only, whereas committed agents are potentially 
interested to work for both periods. We assume that the principal wants to avoid hiring 
uncommitted agents, for example because of training and other turnover costs.
The sequence of events is as follows:
1. Nature draws types.
2. The principal designs a compensation plan consisting of a first period wage, a 
second period wage, and possibly an exit bonus, and decides whether to advertise 
the exit bonus or not.
3. Agents decide whether to apply for a job with the principal.
4. Agents are hired and make an effort choice for the first period, during which they 
learn about their intrinsic motivation to work for the principal. The first period 
wage is paid out.
5. The principal decides whether to offer an exit bonus or not.
6. Agents decide whether to quit or continue working for the principal. Those who 
quit enjoy their second period outside option utility and, if it was offered in Stage 
5, the exit bonus.
7. Agents who continue make an effort choice for the second period and receive the 
second period wage.
4  Analysis
We solve the model by backward induction.
4.1  Period 2
At the start of Period 2, each employed agent needs to decide on whether to continue 
employment with the principal or to quit, which may depend on his realization of moti-
vational type. The agent has learned his type in Period 1, so in case he stays at the firm, 
makes his effort choice according to whether or not he is motivated. The unmotivated 
agent derives utility:
so he has no reason to put in effort:
The motivated agent on the other hand maximizes:
Ui2 = n
(
w2 + 0 −
1
2
휃e2
i2
)
,
(1)ei2 = 0.
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which yields the following optimal effort level:
Agents decide on whether to continue employment with the principal based on the 
realization of their motivation parameter and the wage the principal offers, com-
pared to their outside opportunities. In the absence of an exit bonus, which will be 
introduced in Sect. 4.3, a motivated agent stays iff:
An unmotivated agent, who earns no motivational rents, continues iff:
Hence, the principal should offer w2 < Vi in order to induce all unmotivated agents 
with at most outside option utility Vi to quit. As we shall see in Sect. 4.3, this solu-
tion to the adverse selection problem regarding agents’ motivation sometimes con-
flicts with solving the adverse selection problem regarding agents’ commitment to 
the job.
4.2  Period 1
At the start of Period 1, agents need to decide whether they find it worthwhile to 
apply for the job offered by the principal. This decision is based on the expected 
utility in Period 2, the effort choice in Period 1, and the wage profile offered by the 
principal.
When the agent starts working for the principal, he does not know what motiva-
tional type he is. Since effort is not monitored, effort in Period 1 has no effect on 
the agent’s expected utility in Period 2, other than through learning his motivational 
type (which happens for any ei1 > 0 ). Hence, an agent will choose a level of effort 
that maximizes his expected utility in Period 1, which is described by:
Utility maximization yields:
Comparing this result to the effort choices in Period 2, where agents are aware of 
their type, it can be seen that the effort choice of the uncertain agent lies in between 
Ui2 = n
(
w2 + ?̄?ei2 −
1
2
𝜃e2
i2
)
,
(2)ei2 =
?̄?
𝜃
.
n
(
w2 +
?̄?2
2𝜃
)
≥ nVi.
nw2 ≥ nVi.
(3)
피Ui1 = w1 + q
(
?̄?ei1 −
1
2
𝜃e2
i1
)
+ (1 − q)
(
0 −
1
2
𝜃e2
i1
)
= w1 + q?̄?ei1 −
1
2
𝜃e2
i1
.
(4)
ei1 = q
?̄?
𝜃
.
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that of an unmotivated agent, ei2 = 0 , and that of a motivated agent, ei2 = ?̄?𝜃 . The higher the probability of being a motivated agent, q, the more effort will be provided 
to reap the benefits of that possibility.
Applying at the firm is beneficial to an agent if his expected utility from having 
the job exceeds his opportunity costs. The agent is aware of his outside option Vi 
and knows whether he is uncommitted, i.e. he wants to work in Period 1 only. Using 
Eqs. (3) and (4), it follows that uncommited agents can be deterred from applying iff:
Hence, the wage in the first period should be sufficiently low, as in Lazear (1979). 
Committed agents decide to apply iff:
where we have substituted the optimal effort levels described in Eqs.  (1), (2), and 
(4). Note that Condition (5) implies that, quite naturally, we focus on a case in which 
the contract is designed such that agents who find out that they are motivated expect 
to continue employment with the principal.6 The unmotivated agents on the other 
hand may choose to quit, but only if their outside option is higher than the wage paid 
by the principal in Period 2.
4.3  Contract Design
In this subsection we focus on the most interesting case where the principal wants 
to deter all—that is, irrespective of their outside options—uncommitted agents from 
applying and wants to attract all committed agents. We deal with other possible 
cases in Sect. 4.4.
The adverse selection problem regarding agents’ commitment is resolved when 
the participation constraint of the uncommitted agents with low outside options is 
violated (the participation constraint of the uncommitted agents with high outside 
options is then violated too). Hence, the principal sets7:
피U1 ≤ Vi ⟺ w1 +
q2?̄?2
2𝜃
≤ Vi.
(5)
피U1 + 피Ui2 ≥ (1 + n)Vi
⟺ w1 +
q2?̄?2
2𝜃
+ n
(
q
(
w2 +
?̄?2
2𝜃
)
+ (1 − q)max
{
Vi,w2
})
≥ (1 + n)Vi,
6 This is consistent with the principal’s aim to deter uncommitted agents, because she wants (some) 
agents to continue employment into Period 2. Note that, if Condition (5) is satisfied, motivated agents 
prefer to continue: when the second period wage is designed to make an agent apply for the job before 
he knows whether he is motivated, he will be happy to continue once he learns that he will earn motiva-
tional rents.
7 To be sure, the principal could of course also set a lower wage in the first period, and adapt the second 
period wage to compensate for this. This does not affect our key results qualitatively.
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That is, she must make sure the wage in Period 1 does not exceed the lower one of 
the outside options, V  , net of the expected motivational rent in the first period q2 ?̄?2
2𝜃
 . 
Similarly, the participation constraint for all committed agents will be satisfied when 
it is satisfied for the committed agents with a high outside option:
We need to distinguish two cases. We will later derive the conditions under which 
each case becomes relevant. In the first case, when Eqs. (6) and (7) imply w2 < V  , 
all unmotivated agents quit after Period 1 and the second period wage is set at:
That is, the second period wage, which is paid nq times in expected terms, needs to 
compensate for the outside option V  , but can extract the motivational rents ?̄?2
2𝜃
 , while 
compensating for the relatively low wage in the first period.
In the second, more interesting, case, where Eqs. (6) and (7) necessitate w2 > V  , 
all agents expect to stay, even those who have discovered in Period 1 that they are 
unmotivated.8 The second period wage needed to attract all committed agents reads:
which, together with the condition w2 > V  , implies that for this case to occur, it 
must hold that:
Very similar to Eq.  (8), the second period wage in this more interesting case, as 
described by Eq. (9), compensates for the outside option, extracts motivational rents, 
and compensates for the low wage in Period 1. The only difference is that it accounts 
for the fact that now all, even the unmotivated, agents expect to receive it. Rather 
than extracting full motivational rents as in the case where only motivated agents 
expect to continue, it extracts the expected motivational rents. Likewise, the com-
pensation for the low first period wage does not need to be as high, because the 
expected duration of employment is longer. In this second case, even the unmoti-
vated agents prefer to remain employed by the principal, the second adverse selec-
tion problem. It occurs because the second period payoff exceeds the outside option, 
(6)w1 = V −
q2?̄?2
2𝜃
.
(7)w1 +
q2?̄?2
2𝜃
+ n
(
q
(
w2 +
?̄?2
2𝜃
)
+ (1 − q)max
{
V ,w2
})
≥ (1 + n)V .
(8)w2 = V −
?̄?2
2𝜃
+
V − V
nq
.
(9)w2 = V −
q?̄?2
2𝜃
+
V − V
n
,
(10)V − V > nq ?̄?
2
2𝜃
.
8 We treat the third case, where V < w
2
< V  , in the next subsection.
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even in the absence of motivational rents. Recall that the principal cannot solve 
this problem by reducing the second period wage in exchange for an increase in the 
first period wage, as this would contravene the solution to the first adverse selection 
problem described by Eq. (6).
The principal can overcome the adverse selection problem by offering a one-off 
payment to all employees who quit at the start of Period 2, the exit bonus b. In order 
for it to induce unmotivated agents to leave, it needs to violate their continuation 
constraint. She can offer a relatively low exit bonus such that only the unmotivated 
agents with high outside opportunities quit, or a higher one that also induces those 
with low outside opportunities to leave. We will first analyze the implications of a 
relatively low exit bonus. Unmotivated agents with high outside opportunities will 
quit if the exit bonus is set such that:
When this condition is set binding, some unmotivated agents will self-select and 
quit, while all motivated agents will continue because of the motivational rents they 
earn. Substituting Eq. (9) into Eq. (11) gives after some rewriting:
Offering this exit bonus increases the principal’s profits by nw2 − b = nV  for each 
unmotivated worker who quits.9 Note that Eq.  (12) implies a strictly positive exit 
bonus whenever the second adverse selection problem occurs, namely when Con-
dition (10) holds. The outside option dispersion V − V  is a representation of the 
severity of the first adverse selection problem. If it is large, it is relatively hard to 
attract all committed agents while deterring all uncommitted agents, thus requiring 
a steeper wage profile. This is so because w1 increases in V  , whereas w2 decreases 
in it, while increasing in V  [see Eqs.  (6) and (9)]. Only if this outside option dis-
persion is larger than the expected motivational rents earned in Period 2, an exit 
bonus is useful. This case becomes less likely when the probability of being the 
motivated type q or the duration of the second period n increases. The intuition is 
that higher expected motivational rents enable the principal to offer a lower second 
period wage, thus discouraging the unmotivated agents to stay. Note that the princi-
pal would prefer to pay a negative exit bonus when Condition (10) is violated, that 
is unexpectedly charge agents who want to quit. We rule this out, however, by not 
allowing the principal to deprive agents of their freedom to leave, i.e. b ≥ 0.
The principal may also choose to offer a higher exit bonus such that all unmoti-
vated agents quit. This can be achieved by satisfying the following condition:
(11)nw2 ≤ nV + b ⟺ b ≥ n
(
w2 − V
)
.
(12)b = V − V − nq ?̄?
2
2𝜃
.
(13)b ≥ n
(
w2 − V
)
.
9 Recall that unmotivated workers do not exert effort and, therefore, do not produce any valuable output 
for the principal.
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Once again setting this condition binding and substituting Eq. (9) yields the follow-
ing expression:
Offering this exit bonus results in an increase in the principal’s profits of 
nw2 − b = nV  for each unmotivated worker who leaves.10 Quite naturally, this exit 
bonus deterring all unmotivated agents from staying exceeds the one in Eq. (12) by 
exactly n times the dispersion in outside opportunities. This is problematic, how-
ever, because such a high exit bonus may also induce some motivated agents to quit. 
Indeed, motivated agents with high outside opportunities quit if:
Using Eqs. (9) and (14), one can see that this condition is met whenever V − V ≥ ?̄?2
2𝜃
 . 
It follows that, keeping in mind Condition (10), the high exit bonus to deter all 
unmotivated agents from staying can only be implemented without losing any moti-
vated agents when nq < 1.11
In summary, we have derived an expression for the first period wage that solves 
the adverse selection problem regarding agents’ commitment to the job. In order to 
satisfy the participation constraint of the committed agents, a certain second period 
wage needs to be offered. Depending on parameters, this wage profile may lead to 
an adverse selection problem concerning agents’ motivation. We have shown that an 
exit bonus can alleviate the second adverse selection problem.
As long as no motivated agents are encouraged to quit by an exit bonus, it is 
clearly optimal to offer it. This is so because the unmotivated agents’ optimal effort 
choice is ei2 = 0 , yielding no production. Under this assumption it follows immedi-
ately from Eq. (11) that it is more profitable for the principal to induce some unmo-
tivated agents to quit by offering the exit bonus, amounting to costs of n(w2 − V) , 
rather than keeping them and paying out the second period wage n times, amounting 
to nw2 . The same holds for the exit bonus described by Condition (13), provided that 
Condition (15) is violated so that motivated agents do not quit.
Generally speaking, the exit bonus could serve as a form of insurance for the 
agents against the possibility to turn out unmotivated. Since this benefits the agents, 
(14)b = (1 + n)
(
V − V
)
− nq
?̄?2
2𝜃
.
(15)b ≥ n
(
w2 +
?̄?2
2𝜃
− V
)
.
10 Note that this is a smaller amount than in the case of the lower exit bonus analyzed above. However, 
more unmotivated workers will accept the offer, which may render the higher exit bonus a more profit-
able alternative.
11 If nq > 1 , designing a contract with a high exit bonus is not profit-maximizing in our framework for 
the following reason. Our analysis rests on the assumption that the principal is in need of motivated 
agents for Period 2. If she were not interested in keeping the motivated agents with high outside oppor-
tunities, she could have deterred all agents with high outside opportunities from the very beginning by 
offering a lower second period wage (see Sect. 4.4).
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announcing the exit bonus should enable the principal to save on the wages that need 
to be offered.12 However, if the exit bonus were announced, the uncommitted agents 
could only be deterred from applying if the first period wage is even lower, namely 
taking into account that they will always take advantage of the exit bonus after work-
ing for the first period. Naturally, this requires that the principal set an even higher 
second period wage such that committed agents find it worthwhile to apply despite 
the low first period wage. Such a high second period wage would in turn necessitate 
an increase in the exit bonus in order to induce unmotivated agents to quit, requiring 
yet another decrease in the first period wage and so forth. Since the exit bonus and the 
first period wage are perfect substitutes for the uncommitted agents, it follows that the 
principal cannot solve both adverse selection problems once that agents anticipate an 
exit bonus. A formal exposition of this argument is contained in the "Appendix" sec-
tion. The important conclusion is that the exit bonus needs to come as a surprise, and 
hence should not be advertised, in order to function well.
4.4  Other Cases
The previous section has been confined to the most interesting case where the prin-
cipal wants to hire all committed agents and none of the uncommitted agents at 
the start of the first period, and where either all or none of the unmotivated agents 
expect to quit at the beginning of the second period. Here we briefly deal with the 
other possible cases.
First, we have so far disregarded the case where V ≤ w2 ≤ V  . It implies that 
agents who find out that they are unmotivated will quit when they have high outside 
opportunities, but expect to stay when their outside option is low. Maintaining the 
assumption that the principal wants to attract all committed agents, she chooses to 
offer such a second period wage for a certain parameter interval. As in the previous 
subsection, the conditions on parameters can be found by substituting the second 
period wage.13 After some rewriting, this yields:
When the principal is in this situation she may choose to offer an exit bonus in order 
to also induce unmotivated agents with low outside opportunities to quit. Naturally, 
the principal will offer it after the unmotivated agents with high outside options have 
left already. It should then be set at:
nq
nq + 1
?̄?2
2𝜃
≤ V − V ≤ nq
?̄?2
2𝜃
.
b =
1 + nq
q
(
V − V
)
− n
?̄?2
2𝜃
.
12 Note that both the principal and the agents are risk-neutral towards income, so insurance could not 
lead to a Pareto improvement. Nonetheless, by offering the exit bonus the principal incurs expenses that 
are beneficial to the agents, so she should be able to extract these benefits by offering lower wages.
13 Note that the expression for the second period wage to be used is the same as in Eq. (8), the first case 
treated in the previous subsection.
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Note that, again, this exit bonus may prompt some motivated agents to quit. As 
before, the condition for some motivated agents to quit under this exit bonus would 
be V − V > ?̄?2
2𝜃
.
Second, in all cases treated so far, the principal could increase the exit bonus to a level 
that prompts some, or even all, motivated agents to quit after Period 1. As noted in the 
previous subsection, this would conflict with the assumption that the principal is in need 
of motivated agents for Period 2. If she were not interested in employing all motivated 
agents in Period 2, but only those with low outside opportunities, she can offer a wage 
profile that circumvents the adverse selection problem regarding agents’ motivation. It 
would consist of a first period wage as described by Eq. (6) and a second period wage 
that is sufficient to induce the motivated agents with low outside opportunities to stay:
When offering this second period wage, agents who find out they are not motivated 
prefer to quit and no exit bonus is needed.
Third, the principal may wish to tolerate some uncommitted agents in the first 
period. She will already attract uncommitted agents with low outside opportunities 
by marginally increasing the first period wage. As a consequence, she could decrease 
the second period wage while still making the committed agents apply. This, however, 
gives the adverse selection concerning agents’ motivation less bite, so the exit bonus 
can also be decreased. This process could be continued until the exit bonus reaches 
its natural downward boundary b = 0 . Thus, when allowing for some uncommitted 
agents to apply, she can alleviate the adverse selection problem concerning agents’ 
motivation the same way the lower exit bonus would do by offering a simple flat wage:
Note that at this wage profile, uncommitted agents with high outside opportunities 
still prefer not to apply.
Last, the principal may wish to hire all agents at the start of the first period. The 
principal can do so by offering a first period wage marginally above:
The following second period wage is then sufficient to retain all motivated agents:
Note that this is less than what is paid in the first period. It is just sufficient to keep 
the motivated agents with high outside opportunities from leaving the principal. 
At the same time, it may convince all unmotivated agents to quit, namely when 
V − V <
?̄?2
2𝜃
 . The optimal scheme for the principal will eventually depend on these 
parameters, the costs associated with employing uncommitted agents, and the rela-
tive mass of agents with high or low outside opportunities.
w2 = V −
?̄?2
2𝜃
.
w1 = w2 = V −
q2 + nq
1 + nq
?̄?2
2𝜃
.
w1 = V −
q2?̄?2
2𝜃
.
w2 = V −
?̄?2
2𝜃
.
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4.5  Discussion
The key findings of our analysis are twofold. First, using an exit bonus is only 
optimal when the outside option dispersion is large and intrinsic motivation plays 
a comparatively minor role. The intuition behind this finding is that keeping out 
uncommitted agents necessitates a steep wage profile, in which the wage difference 
is driven by the dispersion in outside options. Returning to our motivating example 
of Zappos, one could hypothesize that the supply of uncommitted labor is particu-
larly high in a vice industry-driven economy like Nevada’s (see e.g. The Economist 
2010).
The adverse selection problem regarding agents’ motivation, on the other hand, 
only becomes pertinent when the wage difference between periods is large com-
pared to the difference in motivation. Zappos does not offer a salary increase right 
after training; however, it has been growing rapidly over the last years and has thus 
been able to offer career opportunities that may act in lieu of wage increases (cf. 
Lazear 1979; Witkin 2012; Geron 2009).
The economics literature on intrinsic motivation typically does not focus on low 
skilled, repetitive jobs like those of a customer service representative. Taylor (2008), 
however, suggests that Zappos has created a work environment in which motivation 
plays a role. This relates to its policy of avoiding performance measurement with the 
tools common to this industry in favor of having motivated, empowered employees 
(cf. Hsieh 2010). While Zappos reportedly creates a pleasant work environment (see 
e.g. Fortune 2012; Glassdoor 2013), the actual tasks of working in customer service 
have been shown to be emotionally exhausting (cf. Singh et al. 1994), giving rise 
to the notion that a motivated employee may enjoy the job not much more than an 
unmotivated employee.
So far, we have only considered the potential effect of the pleasant working con-
ditions at Zappos on workers’ intrinsic motivation. It may, however, very well be 
that some people do find out that they enjoy working at this firm, but at the same 
time are not inclined to exert effort. As a consequence, even an employee who finds 
out to be unmotivated may, in view of the career opportunities or the pleasant work 
environment at Zappos, prefer to remain in the firm. In line with the predictions of 
our model, this would be a situation where an employer finds it profit increasing to 
offer an exit bonus.
Second, we predict that the exit bonus needs to come as a surprise to the agents 
in order to function well. The question of whether or not potential applicants do 
anticipate that Zappos may offer an exit bonus is an empirical one. We do, however, 
have reason to believe the exit bonus is not commonly anticipated. While Zappos 
does confirm the existence of the exit bonus publicly (see e.g. Hsieh 2010; Zappos 
2013b), these sources are directed at interested outsiders rather than potential future 
employees. Most importantly, there is no mention of the exit bonus in job descrip-
tions or on the recruitment website (see e.g. Zappos 2013a). Another indication 
that McFarland’s (2008) concern about word-of-mouth has not (yet) materialized is 
that the exit bonus is only accepted by a one-digit percentage of new hires (see e.g. 
Hsieh 2010; Zappos 2013b). If the exit bonus were anticipated by a large fraction 
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of the local labor force, one would expect this number to be higher, despite Zappos’ 
screening efforts.
Furthermore, we have made some conjectures concerning the production function 
of the firm and concerning conditions in the labor market that lead to the emergence 
of an exit bonus. Zappos asserts to be interested in its employees remaining in the 
firm for long periods (cf. Geron 2009), a fact that supports the notion that it is costly 
to grant short-term employment, which is the reason why the principal in our model 
chooses to deter uncommitted agents from applying. Our model shows that a profit-
maximizing principal in need of some new motivated agents may hire agents with 
low outside opportunities and design a flat wage that will prompt agents who find 
out that they are unmotivated to quit. If, however, the principal is in need of many 
new motivated agents,14 the second period wage needed is “too high”, such that an 
exit bonus emerges. We believe a fast growing firm with a pronounced emphasis on 
customer service like Zappos fits this scenario very well.
5  Concluding Remarks
We have put forward a model that shows under which circumstances a firm may find 
it optimal to use exit bonuses to convince intrinsically unmotivated employees to 
quit. We have shown that such a situation may arise when a firm offers a steep wage 
profile, in our example due to an adverse selection problem caused by potential job 
applicants with a short horizon. In particular, this problem needs to be severe in 
comparison to the expected motivational rents earned during an applicant’s career. 
As a consequence, an exit bonus is more likely to be offered when potential appli-
cants do not expect to enjoy working in this particular job too much.
Alternative explanations as to why we observe the exit bonus appear to fail. For 
example, the exit bonus may be used by an employer to signal that employees can 
earn motivational rents when working for her, rather than as a means to solve the 
adverse selection problem concerning agents’ motivation. However, in that case, we 
would expect Zappos to advertise the exit bonus actively. The same is true when exit 
bonuses are used to solve a commitment problem on the side of the employer. For 
instance, an employer may be able to commit to creating a pleasant work environ-
ment by offering an exit bonus. The first adverse selection problem that we identi-
fied may apply here too, making advertised exit bonuses not profit-maximizing.
Indeed, our analysis suggests that an exit bonus must not be advertised. As such, the 
exit bonus may be considered an out of equilibrium phenomenon. If offering it became 
a common HR practice, our model predicts that it would no longer have the desired 
effect. One would have to expect an influx of uncommitted applicants who are (only) 
interested in receiving the exit bonus after a short training period. This would require 
increasing screening efforts by HR departments to filter out such job candidates 
which—at least in some environments—may not be feasible or prohibitively costly.
14 Note that the satisfaction of this need comes hand in hand with the necessity to tolerate some unmoti-
vated agents in the second period, unless nq < 1.
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An analogy to the dynamics described above can be found in a rather delicate 
area: In 2012, Switzerland started to offer Tunisian asylum seekers money if they 
decide to return to their country of origin (cf. NZZ 2012).15 Applications for asylum 
from Tunisian citizens are rarely accepted in the Swiss Confederation and refugees 
are only eligible for the “return assistance” before their application for asylum has 
been decided on. It could be argued that the information structure in this example 
is comparable to that in our model. Applicants have private information on their 
chances to receive refugee status, and are willing to await the ruling in the rela-
tively bad living conditions of an asylum seeker (cf. Hatton 2004). If offered money 
upon return, some applicants may decide to return, namely those who are relatively 
“unmotivated”, because they deem their chances of being accepted as low. Just as 
in our setup, it is crucial that this policy is not widely known. Otherwise, one could 
expect refugee numbers to rise, or even non-immigrants starting to apply for asylum 
in the hope of receiving a return assistance.
The motivation to develop the model presented in this paper originated in an 
observation of one single firm. Even though several other firms have followed Zap-
pos’ lead in the meanwhile, this could raise concerns about the relevance of the HR 
policy we analyze. We can, however, conceive a few arguments to put the scarcity of 
observations into perspective. While it is of course possible that using an exit bonus 
is not profit maximizing, our model yields conditions under which its use would be 
the optimal strategy. It may be that these conditions are just not satisfied at other 
firms. Secondly, other firms may simply not be aware of this innovation in compen-
sation policies. This is supported by the attention that Zappos and the other tech 
firms’ conduct has received in the business press.16 Finally, a key result of our analy-
sis is that the exit bonus needs to come as a surprise. In light of this, it may very well 
be that firms use tools such as exit bonuses without outsiders knowing about it.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, 
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the 
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix
In Sect. 4.3 we have given an intuitive account as to why the exit bonus must not be 
anticipated by the agents. Formally, the argument runs as follows. With an antici-
pated exit bonus, the first period wage must fulfill the following condition in order to 
still deter all uncommitted agents from applying:
(16)w1 ≤ V − b −
q2?̄?2
2𝜃
.
16 We also note an increased academic interest in pay-to-quit schemes, see e.g. the experimental study by 
Harris (2015).
15 Note that Switzerland and other countries offer several forms of return assistance to refugees and 
other migrants (see e.g. Swiss Confederation 2015; Rijksoverheid 2015; or UK Border Agency 2014). 
The Swiss program for Tunisian asylum seekers, however, exposes most parallels to our study.
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When the principal advertises the exit bonus, it becomes common knowledge that it 
will always be set such that at least the unmotivated agents with high outside oppor-
tunities leave after Period 1. As a result, the overall participation constraint of the 
committed agents collapses to:
Combined with Eq. (16), this gives us the following expression for the second period 
wage:
where the equality sign follows from profit-maximization by the principal. So, in 
comparison to the previously found expressions, the principal can indeed extract the 
expected value of exit bonus payments 1−q
nq
b in the second period wage. Finally, the 
exit bonus needs to violate the continuation constraint of the committed unmotivated 
agents with high outside opportunities:
Using Eq. (17), it follows that:
Setting Condition (16) binding, we get an expression for w1 that we substitute:
That is, the exit bonus cannot be set optimally anymore. An announced exit bonus 
b and the first period wage w1 become perfect substitutes so that it is impossible to 
solve both adverse selection problems at once.
w1 +
q2?̄?2
2𝜃
+ n
(
q
(
w2 +
?̄?2
2𝜃
)
+ (1 − q)
(
V+
b
n
))
≥ (1 + n)V .
(17)
w2 ≥
(1 + n)V
nq
−
w1
nq
−
1
nq
q2?̄?2
2𝜃
−
1 − q
q
(
V +
b
n
)
−
?̄?2
2𝜃
⇒w2 =
1 + nq
nq
V −
w1
nq
−
(q
n
+ 1
)
?̄?2
2𝜃
−
1 − q
nq
b,
b ≥ n
(
w2 − V
)
.
b = n
(
1 + nq
nq
V −
w1
nq
−
q + n
n
?̄?2
2𝜃
−
(1 − q)
nq
b − V
)
⟺ b = V − w1 − q(q + n)
?̄?2
2𝜃
.
b = V − V + b +
q2?̄?2
2𝜃
− q(q + n)
?̄?2
2𝜃
⟺ 0 = V − V − nq
?̄?2
2𝜃
.
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